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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Just Say No! United States Options to
Extradition to the North of Ireland's
Diplock Court System
It is not those who can inflict the most but those who can suffer the
most who will conquer. Terrance McSwiney1
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1972, the United States entered into a formal extradition
treaty with the United Kingdom. 2 This treaty originally allowed for a
"political offense" exception to extradition which was determined on
a case by case basis by the judiciary. 3 Although varying interpreta-
tions of this exception have been promulgated, 4 the political offense
exception is not the focus of this Comment. Rather, this Comment
seeks to answer two questions: First, does the United States have a
1. Terrance McSwiney was the mayor of Cork who died in 1920 in a British prison after
seventy-four days on a hunger strike. Hunger striking has a long history in Irish culture as a
way of shaming an adversary into yielding to a striker's position. D. BERESFORD, TEN MEN
DEAD: THE STORY OF THE 1981 IRisH HUNGER STRIKE iii (1987).
2. Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, June 8, 1972,
United States-United Kingdom, 28 U.S.T. 227, T.I.A.S. No. 8468 [hereinafter U.S.-U.K. Ex-
tradition Treaty].
3. Id. art. V(l)(c)(i)-(ii). These provisions state:
(1) Extradition shall not be granted if:
(c)(i) the offense for which extradition is requested is regarded by the requested Party
as one of a political character; or
(ii) the person sought proves that the request for his extradition has in fact been made
with a view to try or punish him for an offense of a political character.
There has been some controversy regarding whether the judicial, legislative or executive
branch is authorized to make this "political character" determination. Historically, the judici-
ary has rejected any executive infringement upon its right to decide the issue. See Quinn v.
Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 787 (9th Cir. 1986). However, the question of who decides whether
or not the offense was political is now moot since Congress has legislated the exception out of
the treaty.
4. There are essentially three political offense exception tests. (1) The French "objec-
tive" test, (2) the Swiss "proportionality" test, and (3) the Anglo-American "incidence" test.
For a review of these as well as the history of the political offense exception see Quinn, 783
F.2d 776, 794-95 (9th Cir. 1986). The analysis that has been most widely used in the Ameri-
can courts is the "incidence" test.
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moral obligation not to extradite those accused of "scheduled of-
fenses," 5 political offense exception or not, due to the extent of dero-
gation6 that exists in the Diplock7 court system of "Northern
' 8
Ireland? Second, if there is a moral obligation not to extradite, what
alternatives are available to the United States?
To understand the implications of these questions one must first
look at the historical deve.pmns at led 'to thle Current StuatL..:.
Then, the Diplock courts themselves will be analyzed, along with the
consequences of extradition. Finally, options to extradition will be
proposed which consider the legal and moral obligations of the
United States.
A. Historical Perspective
The history of the Anglo-Irish conflict is a long and sordid story,
far beyond the scope of this Comment. There is a large body of work
dealing with the subject, 9 and the following is only a cursory overview
to lay a foundation for the ensuing discussion.
5. Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act of 1978, ch. 5, sched. 4, pts. I-III.
"Scheduled" offenses are specific crimes, the commission of which subjects the perpetrator to
trial in the special Diplock courts as opposed to an ordinary court of law. The list of offenses is
extensive, including murder, manslaughter, rioting, kidnapping, and possession of firearms or
explosives. Id. pt. I(1-11).
6. Derogation in this context means any emergency provision that departs from the
minimum standards established by the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, E.T.S. 5 [hereinafter
European Convention].
7. Diplock courts derive their name from Lord Diplock, author of the REPORT OF THE
COMMISSION TO CONSIDER LEGAL PROCEDURES TO DEAL WITH TERRORIST ACTIVITIES IN
NORTHERN IRELAND, 1972, CMND. No. 5185 (1972) [hereinafter DIPLOCK REPORT]. His
committee's recommendations were subsequently adopted as the Northern Ireland (Emer-
gency Provisions) Act of 1973 which was reaffirmed as the Northern Ireland (Emergency Pro-
visions) Act of 1978. (These measures will be discussed infra at Part II of this Comment.) For
an excellent critique of Diplock's report see Twining, Emergency Powers and the Criminal
Process: The Diplock Report, 1973 CRIM. L. REV. 406.
8. "There is no neutrality in Northern Ireland, at least not in the terminological sense:
the use of the term 'Northern Ireland' places a writer on one side of the conflict, because to an
Irish Nationalist there is no such entity." D. BERESFORD, supra note 1, at I. Loyalists refer to
the six counties as Northern Ireland or Ulster interchangeably. Nationalists refer to the six
counties as the "north" of Ireland. See also Playboy Interview: The LR.A., PLAYBOY MAG.,
April 1989, at 55 (interview with Danny Morrison and Gerry Adams of Sinn Fein).
9. See, e.g., D. BERESFORD, supra note 1; K. BOYLE, T. HADDEN & P. HILLYARD, TEN
YEARS ON IN NORTHERN IRELAND: THE LEGAL CONTROL OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE 8
(1980); T. COOGAN, ON THE BLANKET: THE H BLOCK STORY (1980); K. KELLEY, THE
LONGEST WAR: NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE I.R.A. (1982); M. MACDONALD, CHILDREN
OF WRATH (1986); E. O'BALLANCE, TERROR IN IRELAND (1981).
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1. That Was Then...
The Anglo invasion of Ireland dates back to the 1 100s. How-
ever, England did not solidify its hold on Ireland until 1690 when the
Protestant William of Orange defeated the Catholic King James at the
Battle of the Boyne. During the 1600s, the English implemented a
very successful "plantation of Ulster" policy whereby Scottish
Presbyterians were given confiscated land to encourage them to settle
in the north of Ireland. 10 This policy helped facilitate England's con-
trol of the native Irish at that time and directly resulted in the Protes-
tant majority there today. Periodically, the Irish rebelled against
English rule," but a serious challenge to England's control was not
mounted until the early 1900s.
In 1916, the Irish Republican Army ("I.R.A.") started a war of
independence which lasted until 1921.12 The ensuing political settle-
ment created the Free State of Ireland from twenty-six counties, leav-
ing six counties from the north as part of the United Kingdom.1 3 A
civil war followed in the Free State of Ireland over this political settle-
ment1 4 and lasted throughout the 1920s. The six counties in the north
of Ireland initially remained autonomous and a Northern Ireland Par-
liament was created at Stormont. The north of Ireland remained rela-
tively stable until the 1960s.15 In 1968, however, a new era in the life
of the north "erupted" rather peacefully.
2. This Is Now...
The "troubles," as they are commonly referred to,' 6 started with
the civil rights marches of the late 1960s. Members of the minority
populace (the Catholics) in the north of Ireland demanded equal
10. M. MACDONALD, supra note 9, at 22.
11. D. BERESFORD, supra note 1, at xi. The rebellions against English rule have been
perpetual, but notable uprisings occurred in 1798 (led by Wolfe Tone), 1803, 1823, 1848, 1867,
and finally in 1916.
12. The Easter uprising in Dublin in 1916 was led by James Connally and Peadrig
Pearce. Although initially unsuccessful, ten members of the uprising were executed. Ironi-
cally, this actually increased popular support for the revolution and eventually helped it to
succeed. See generally supra note 9.
13. Ireland consists of thirty-two counties comprising the four provinces of Munster,
Leinster, Ulster, and Connaught. The six counties in the north are referred to as the six coun-
ties, the "north" of Ireland, Northern Ireland, or Ulster. D. BERESFORD, supra note 1, at xi.
14. Id.
15. I.R.A. activity in the north erupted in virtually every decade but was not sustained
until 1970. M. MACDONALD, supra note 9, at 85-86.
16. See generally supra note 9.
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rights from members of the majority (the Protestants). 17 The Official/
Protestant response to these demands became increasingly more vio-
lent'8 and led to the resurgence of the I.R.A. as the protectorate of the
Catholic ghettos. 19 Concerned with the increase in violence, England
sent British troops to the north on August 15, 1969, to restore
peace.20 By 1972, England had disbanded the Stormont Parliament
and instituted its own direct rule froi Lonidon. 21 ,T ritish troopsrule1io11 111V .J.J11uLJ LIuUFO
and government are still present today.
Over the years, British legislation concerning the I.R.A. has been
substantial, 22 and in 1972 the United States signed an extradition
treaty with the government of Prime Minister Edward Heath to extra-
dite suspected "terrorists" 23 to the United Kingdom. 24 A handful of
Irish fugitives2 5 have tested the enforceability of this treaty with some
success. This very same success, 2 6 coupled with international political
considerations,27 led to the 1986 Supplement, 28 which virtually elimi-
17. Presently, there is approximately a 2:1 Protestant to Catholic ratio in the north of
Ireland. M. MACDONALD, supra note 9, at 28. For the most part, Catholics are assumed to
be nationalists and Protestants are regarded as loyalists. K. BOYLE, T. HADDEN & P. HILL-
YARD, supra note 9, at 8.
18. See K. KELLEY, supra note 9, at 97-119.
19. Id. at 124-31. The I.R.A. split in 1970 into the Official ("O.I.R.A.") and Provisional
("P.I.R.A." or "Provos") wings. The O.I.R.A. renounced violence. Although both are pro-
scribed organizations under the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act of 1978, ch. 5,
sched. 2, the P.I.R.A. is the focus of the 1972 extradition treaty.
20. K. KELLEY, supra note 9, at 120-21. The British troops initially were welcomed by
the Catholic communities as protection against the Loyalist mobs.
21. Id. at 166.
22. The Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act of 1922, 12 & 13 Geo. 5, ch. 5, was re-
activated in 1971 to allow, among other things, internment without trial. Since then, legisla-
tion includes: (1) the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act of 1973, (2) the Northern
Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act of 1978, (3) THE DETENTION OF TERRORISTS ORDER
1972, STATUTORY INSTRUMENTS No. 1632 (N.I. 15) (repealed in 1975), (4) SPECIAL CATE-
GORY STATUS OF 1972 (repealed in 1976), (5) Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions)
Act of 1984, and (6) the Anglo-Irish Accord of 1985.
23. Terrorism is an inherently subjective term but has been defined by the British as, "the
use of violence for the purpose of putting the public or any section of the public in fear."
DETENTION OF TERRORISTS ORDER 1972, STATUTORY INSTRUMENTS No. 1632 (N.I. 15), at
§ 2.
24. U.S.-U.K. Extradition Treaty, supra note 2.
25. See infra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
26. 132 CONG. REC. S9149 (daily ed. July 16, 1986) (statement of Sen. Pell).
27. An interesting anecdote appeared in "The Irishman,"
President Ronald Reagan, who claims Irish ancestry, strongly endorsed the treaty as
gratitude to Thatcher's support for allowing American planes based in Britain to
attack Libya. France denied the planes permission to fly over French territory. Mar-
garet Thatcher remains one of Reagan's strongest international allies and many U.S.
diplomats and Senators felt the favor should be returned.
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nated the political offense exception from the 1972 treaty.29
B. Extradition Treaty of 1972 and Supplement of 1986
The extradition treaty between the United States and the United
Kingdom was signed on June 8, 1972 and entered into force on Janu-
ary 21, 1977. 30 The United States has nearly one hundred extradition
treaties,3' each with a political offense exception similar to Article V
of the 1972 United States-United Kingdom extradition treaty.32 Four
cases have arisen since the treaty came into effect where the English
government has requested American extradition of an individual for
I.R.A. activity. They are the cases of Peter McMullen,3 3 Desmond
Mackin,34 Joseph Doherty,35 and William Quinn. 36
The courts in McMullen37 and Mackin held that the offenses
committed were governed by the political offense exception and there-
fore refused to extradite. In contrast, the court in Quinn found that
the political offense exception did not apply because the following
three part Anglo-American incidence test was not satisfied: (a) an up-
rising must exist, (b) the charged offense must be in furtherance of the
uprising, and (c) the accused must be a member of the uprising
group.38 The court held that Quinn's offenses, which took place in
England rather than the north of Ireland, were not covered by the
political offense exception because there was no "uprising" in Eng-
land.3 9 As the dissent noted, this reasoning is specious at best, 4° con-
Extradition Treaty Passes Senate, The Irishman, Aug-Sept. 1986, at 1. Bill Quinn was extra-
dited shortly thereafter.
28. Supplemental Extradition Treaty between the United States of America and the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, S. EXEC. REP. No. 17, 99th Cong.,
2d Sess. 1 (1986) [hereinafter 1986 Supplement].
29. See Blakesley, Evisceration of the Political Offense Exception to Extradition, 15 DEN.
J. INT'L LAW & POL'Y 109 (1986).
30. U.S.-U.K. Extradition Treaty, supra note 2.
31. 132 CONG. REC. S9153 (daily ed. July 16, 1986) (statement of Sen. D'Amato).
32. See supra note 3.
33. In re McMullen, Magistrate No. 3-70-1099 MG (memorandum decision) (N.D. Cal.
1979) reprinted in 132 CONG. REC. S9146 (daily ed. July 16, 1986).
34. In re Mackin, 668 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1981).
35. United States v. Doherty, 786 F.2d 491 (2d Cir. 1986).
36. Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776 (9th Cir. 1986).
37. Even though McMullen prevailed at the hearing concerning his extradition to the
United Kingdom, he subsequently failed in his bid to withhold deportation to Ireland. Mc-
Mullen v. I.N.S., 788 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1986). The analysis under deportation is substantially
different than extradition and will be discussed infra at note 184.
38. Quinn, 783 F.2d at 810.
39. Id.
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sidering the constitutional unity of England and the north of Ireland.
Bill Quinn, an American citizen by birth, was subsequently extradited
to England, where he was convicted of murder and conspiracy to
bomb, and sentenced to life in prison.
4
The case of Joseph Doherty is an egregious illustration of how
hard the Executive branch of the United States government will work
to extradite an accused I.R.A. member. Joe Doherty was arrested in
the United States on June 18, 1983.42 He prevailed at his original
extradition hearing 43 but Attorney General Edwin Meese appealed
the ruling. Judge Sprizzo's decision was upheld44 so Meese appealed
again. Joe Doherty prevailed once more,45 and this time the Second
Circuit Court described the Executive branch's position as "star-
tling."' 46 The U.S. government refused to quit and appealed once
again.47 While this appeal is processed, Joe Doherty will have spent
40. Circuit Judge Fletcher, dissenting, stated:
I find persuasive ... the district court's findings that a severe political uprising ex-
isted in the United Kingdom, including England, at the time of the acts of which
Quinn is accused took place. The magistrate recognized the constitutional unity of
Northern Ireland and Great Britain... I cannot agree that when PIRA [Provisional
Irish Republican Army] members revolt against their British rulers in Northern Ire-
land, such acts are protected under the political offense exception, whereas identical
violent acts carried out against the same British rulers in London lose their protected
status.
Id. at 820.
41. Quinn's San Francisco attorney, Patrick Halinan, said that based upon the evidence,
Quinn never would have been convicted in an American court of law. (Quinn was tried in an
English court in London rather than in the Diplock courts because his alleged offenses took
place in England.) Telephone interview with Patrick Halinan, San Francisco, (Oct. 20, 1989).
42. Joseph Doherty,
was a member of the Provisional Irish Republican Army ("PIRA"). On May 2,
1980, at the direction of the I.R.A., he and three other members of PIRA took over a
private house in Belfast, holding a family hostage in the process, as part of an opera-
tion to ambush a convoy of British soldiers. A few hours later a car stopped in front
of the house. Five members of the Special Air Service of the British Army emerged
carrying machine guns. The two groups fired at each other; in the exchange of gun-
fire, Captain Westmacott of the British group was killed.
United States v. Doherty, 786 F.2d 491, 493 (2d Cir. 1986). Doherty escaped from prison
while awaiting trial and was convicted in absentia and sentenced to life imprisonment. McCaf-
frey, Justice Denied: The Joseph Doherty Story, 1 NAT'L BAR EXCHANGE, March 1989, at 4.
43. In re Doherty, 599 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
44. United States v. Doherty, 615 F. Supp. 755 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
45. Doherty, 786 F.2d at 503.
46. Id. at 495.
47. This action by the Executive branch has been widely criticized by senators, congress-
men, federal judges, Cardinal John O'Connor and the A.C.L.U. Representative Thomas Dow-
ney of New York expressed his outrage:
In several instances the U.S. courts have ruled in favor of Mr. Doherty, but that
apparently makes no difference to Mr. Meese who holds English wishes above U.S.
rights .... If he were an Afghan, Mujaheedin, Cuban or a Contra, Mr. Doherty
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six years in the Metropolitan Correction Center in New York.
With the exception of Doherty, the particular facts and holdings
in these cases are interesting from an historical perspective but are not
altogether relevant today. This is because under the 1986 Supple-
ment, which eliminated the political offense exception for specific,
enumerated crimes, 48 there is little doubt that all four individuals
would have been summarily extradited upon a showing of probable
cause.49  During debates on the Supplement, Senator D'Amato ex-
pressed concern that people of Irish descent were being singled out for
unfair treatment.
would be granted asylum at the drop of a hat. But Mr. Meese does not want that so
he is moving heaven and earth to have Mr. Doherty sent back to England.
McCaffrey, supra note 42, at 4.
48. Article 1 of the 1986 Supplement eliminates consideration of the political offense ex-
ception for the following:
(a) an offense within the scope of the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Seizure of Aircraft, opened for signature at The Hague on 16 December 1970;
(b) an offense within the scope of the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, opened for signature at Montreal on 23
September 1971;
(c) an offense within the scope of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents,
opened for signature at New York on 14 December 1973;
(d) an offense within the scope of the International Convention against the Taking of
Hostages, opened for signature at New York on 18 December 1979;
(e) murder;
(f) manslaughter;
(g) maliciously wounding or inflicting grievous bodily harm;
(h) kidnapping, abduction, false imprisonment or unlawful detention, including the
taking of a hostage;
(i) the following offenses relating to explosives:
(1) the causing of an explosion likely to endanger life or cause serious damage to
property; or
(2) conspiracy to cause such an explosion; or
(3) the making or possession of an explosive substance by a person who intends
either himself or through another person to endanger life or cause serious damage to
property;
(0) the following offenses relating to firearms or ammunition:
(1) the possession of a firearm or ammunition by a person who intends either
himself or through another person to endanger life; or
(2) the use of a firearm by a person with intent to resist or prevent the arrest or
detention of himself or another person;
(k) damaging property with intent to endanger life or with reckless disregard as to
whether the life of another would thereby be endangered;
(1) an attempt to commit any of the foregoing offenses.
1986 Supplement, supra note 28.
49. U.S.-U.K. Extradition Treaty, supra note 2, art. IX(l) states, "[e]xtradition shall be
granted only if the evidence be found sufficient according to the law of the requested Party
either to justify the committal for trial of the person sought if the offense of which he is ac-
cused had been committed in the territory of the requested Party .... " This evidence is
defined as probable cause under United States law. See 18 U.S.C. § 3060 (1986).
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The United States is a party to nearly 100 bilateral extradition trea-
ties. Each one has a provision which exempts political offenders
from extradition. No other treaty, even those that have been re-
cently concluded, contains the narrow political offense exception
found in the proposed United States-United Kingdom Supplemen-
tal Extradition Treaty.
50
T I .... .... -y , __ _ 1 u_
1lie mequaiity iecognized Uby Senator DY'ti.IALU I. LU .s-l.s
reservations regarding the Supplement, so, in true legislative compro-
mise, Article 3(a) was added. Article 3(a) abrogates the traditional
non-inquiry restriction on extradition cases and allows a judicial in-
quiry into the court system in the north of Ireland. 51 Article 3(a)
mandates that the judicial branch shall refuse extradition if the person
sought can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she
would be either punished or prejudiced, "on account of his race, reli-
gion, nationality, or political opinions .... -52 This permits the ac-
cused to present evidence concerning his plight in tie Diplock courts
regardless of whether he meets any political exception or not.
5 3
The decision of whether or not to extradite now hinges on the
legitimacy of the court system rather than the motivations of the ac-
cused. This inquiry still could and should be made in the case of Joe
Doherty. The next section of this Comment will attempt to do just
that by exploring the question: To what kind of justice system is the
United States being asked to extradite?
II. THE DIPLOCK COURT SYSTEM: WHAT IS IT?
The trial, true to form, was a farce etc!! Bobby Sands
54
50. 132 CONG. REC. S9153 (daily ed. July 16, 1986) (statement of Sen. D'Amato).
51. 1986 Supplement, supra note 28, Article 3(a) states:
(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Supplemental Treaty, extradi-
tion shall not occur if the person establishes to the satisfaction of the competent
judicial authority by a preponderance of the evidence that the request for extradition
has in fact been made with a view to try or punish him on account of his race,
religion, nationality, or political opinions, or that he would, if surrendered, be
prejudiced at his trial, or punished, detained or restricted in his personal liberty by
reason of his race, religion, nationality, or political opinions.
52. Id.
53. See 132 CONG. REC. S9253 (daily ed. July 17, 1986) (statement of Sen. Biden).
54. D. BERESFORD, supra note 1, at 39. This quote from Bobby Sands was taken from
the communications, smuggled out of prison on cigarette papers, between the hunger strikers
of 1981 and the I.R.A. Army Council. Bobby Sands was the first of the ten I.R.A. and Irish
National Liberation Army hunger strikers to die, trying to achieve a return to political pris-
oner status, on May 5, 1981. For a review of the "special status" given to the I.R.A. in 1972
and its subsequent withdrawal, see Note, Terrorists and Special Status: The British Experience
in Northern Ireland, 9 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 481 (1986).
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Lord Diplock was commissioned by the Secretary of State for
Northern Ireland in 1972 to consider,
what arrangements for the administration of justice in Northern
Ireland could be made in order to deal more effectively with terror-
ist organizations by bringing to book, otherwise than by intern-
ment by the Executive, individuals involved in terrorist activities,
particularly those who plan and direct, but do not necessarily take
part in, terrorist acts; and make recommendations.
5
5
Diplock's commission detailed three specific areas where ordinary
criminal procedures were insufficient. 56 First, too many confessions
were found inadmissible due to the way in which they were gathered.
Second, there was the possibility of witness intimidation. Third, there
was concern about the impartiality of juries in Northern Ireland's
highly polarized society. The authors of "Ten Years On ' 57 summa-
rized the situation as follows:
The package of measures recommended by the Diplock Commis-
sion was specifically designed to overcome these [three] problems.
The extension of the powers of the police to arrest and question
suspects.., was intended to facilitate the police in obtaining con-
fessions from guilty suspects, and so to avoid any difficulty in se-
curing convictions based on evidence from independent witnesses.
Some change in the rules on admissibility was then thought to be
necessary to avoid the risk that such confessions would be ex-
cluded by the judges: hence the provision that statements might be
admitted provided that they had not been obtained by torture or
inhuman or degrading treatment .... Finally, to avoid the risk of
partisan or perverse verdicts, trial by jury was suspended for a list
of offenses likely to be committed by terrorist offenders. These of-
fenses are known as 'scheduled' offenses and the courts in which
such cases are heard are generally referred to as 'Diplock
Courts.'5 8
The recommendations of Diplock's Commission 59 were incorporated
wholesale into the Emergency Provisions Act of 1973.60 These provi-
sions were subsequently readopted in the Emergency Provisions Act
of 1978 and reaffirmed in Lord Baker's 1984 review of the 1978 legis-
55. DIPLOCK REPORT, supra note 7, at 1.
56. K. BOYLE, T. HADDEN & P. HILLYARD, supra note 9, at 57.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. See generally DIPLOCK REPORT, supra note 7.
60. Twining, supra note 7, at 406-07.
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lation.61 They still exist today. Since the Baker Report is the most
thorough and recent governmental adoption of these emergency
measures, it will be the focus of the next section of this Comment.
The emergency provisions presently in place are extensive.
62
Consequently, this discussion will be limited to those specific provi-
sions which would be the subject of an Article 3(a) judicial inquiry
allowed under the 1986 Supplement to the 1972 extradition treaty.
These include: (1) interrogation techniques leading to the introduc-
tion of confessions and their impact on the right to remain silent, 63 (2)
elimination of the right to trial by jury,64 (3) shifting the burden of
proof to the accused for certain offenses, 65 and (4) arrest, seizure and
detention powers. 66 In addition, recently proposed measures include
the elimination of the right to remain silent, i.e. silence as an admis-
sion of guilt,67 and the reintroduction of internment without trial.
68
To understand the significance of these measures we must examine
how the Diplock courts evolved, their justification, and their relation
to internationally accepted minimum standards of due process.
A. Comparison of the Diplock Courts to the Minimum Standards
of Human Rights Established in the European Convention
on Human Rights
There certainly is no dispute that the measures in place in the
north of Ireland to deal with "terrorist" offenses are unusual in a civi-
lized state. Since their inception these measures were acknowledged
derogations from the minimum standards established under the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights.69 Article 15 of the European
61. REVIEW OF THE OPERATION OF THE NORTHERN IRELAND (EMERGENCY PROVI-
SIONS) ACT OF 1978, 1984, CMND. No. 9222 (Lord Baker, Chairman) [hereinafter BAKER
REPORT]. Baker recommended retaining essentially all of the existing emergency provisions
first introduced in the Diplock Report.
62. See Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act of 1978, ch. 5, pts. I-IV.
63. Id. pt. I, § 8.
64. Id. pt. I, § 7.
65. Id. pt. I, § 9.
66. Id. pt. II, §§ 11-20.
67. This was actually proposed in the BAKER REPORT, supra note 61, 189.
68. Internment was stopped in practice in 1975, but the power to intern was never re-
pealed. See Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act of 1978, ch. 5, pt. II, § 12, sched. 1.
See also K. BOYLE, T. HADDEN & P. HILLYARD, supra note 9, at 5.
69. European Convention, supra note 6, art. 15 states:
(1) In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation,
any High Contracting Party may take measures derogating from its obligations
under this Convention to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situa-
[Vol. 12:249
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Convention allows a country to derogate from the minimum stan-
dards prescribed for the preservation of human rights, "[iln a time of
war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation
.... "70 Before implementing measures in derogation from these stan-
dards, a country must inform the Secretary-General of the Council of
Europe (which the United Kingdom did).71
In analyzing the appropriateness of a country's derogation, two
questions must be considered. First, does an emergency exist justify-
ing derogation and secondly, if so, are the measures taken appropriate
to the exigencies of the situation.72 Assuming there was a legitimate
need (i.e. an emergency existed) in 1973 for derogation from the mini-
mum standards of the European Convention in the north of Ireland,
the question of whether an emergency situation can still exist seven-
teen years later persists. Also, and more importantly, are the meas-
ures taken appropriate for the exigencies of the situation?
1. Interrogation and Confessions
The techniques used during interrogation to obtain confessions
and the subsequent admissibility of such confessions at trial have cre-
ated an ongoing controversy over the last twenty years. In fact, this
one emergency provision has been an endless source of written mate-
rial. 73 The root of the controversy is the Diplock report recommenda-
tion 74 which equates Article 3 of the European Convention on Human
Rights with the common law traditions against self-incrimination and
tion, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its other obligations
under international law.
(2) No derogation from Article 2, except in respect of deaths resulting from
lawful acts of war, or from Articles 3, 4 (paragraph 1) and 7 shall be made under this
provision.
(3) Any High Contracting Party availing itself of this right of derogation shall
keep the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe fully informed of the measures
which it has taken and the reasons therefor. It shall also inform the Secretary-Gen-
eral of the Council of Europe when such measures have ceased to operate and the
provisions of the Convention are again being fully executed.
70. Id. art. 15(1).
71. Id. art. 15(3).
72. See Donahue, Human Rights in Northern Ireland: Ireland v. United Kingdom, (1978)
Y.B. European Convention on Human Rights 602 (Eur. Ct. of Human Rights) (judgment) 3
B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 377, 387.
73. See Eisenhower, Interrogation and the Admissibility of Confessions in Northern Ire-
land, I TEMPLE INT'L & COMP. L.J. 7 (1985). See also K. BOYLE, T. HADDEN & P. HILL-
YARD, supra note 9, at app., where the authors propose a "Draft Code of Interrogation
Practice" to alleviate part of the problem.
74. See DIPLOCK REPORT, supra note 7, 73-92.
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involuntary confessions.71 Diplock, in his 1973 report concluded,
"that the detailed technical rules and practice as to the 'admissibility'
of inculpatory statements by the accused as they are currently applied
in Northern Ireland are hampering the course of justice in the case of
terrorist crimes .... 76
In trying to "effectuate" justice, Diplock was confronted with the
common law standards for the admissibility of confessions as weii as
Article 15, section 2 of the European Convention. 77 Article 15, sec-
tion 2 prohibits any derogation from the mandate of Article 3 of the
Convention that, "[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment. ' ' T8 This prohibition applies in
times of war and regardless of whether the detainee has advocated
violence or not.79
To overcome this problem, Diplock recommended ignoring the
common law standard by which admissions were judged. Instead, he
proposed that the admissibility of a confession be governed by the
language of Article 3 so that only statements made after the person
had been tortured or subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment
would be excluded. As a consequence, section 6 of the 1973 Emer-
gency Provisions Act, reaffirmed as section 8 of the 1978 Emergency
Provisions Act, was drafted.80  It allowed for the introduction into
evidence of any statement made by the accused unless, "prima facie
evidence is adduced that the accused was subjected to torture or to
inhuman or degrading treatment in order to induce him to make a
75. At common law, a defendant had a right, "at any stage of an investigation ... to
communicate and consult privately with a solicitor. This is so even if he is in custody and
provided that in such a case no unreasonable delay or hinderance is caused to the process of
investigation or the administration of justice by his doing so." Eisenhower, supra note 73, at
15. For the seminal case in this country dealing with the right to remain silent and involuntary
confessions, see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The progeny of Miranda have made
interesting distinctions between the right to remain silent and the right to counsel during "in-
terrogation." See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977) and Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S.
291 (1980). However, since Baker's 1984 review of the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provi-
sions) Act of 1978 still allows a person to be detained for up to 48 hours in the north of
Ireland, without notification, charging, or attorney contact, this interesting distinction is un-
fortunately inapplicable.
76. DIPLOCK REPORT, supra note 7, 87.
77. European Convention, supra note 6, art. 15(2). See supra note 69 for text.
78. Id. art. 3.
79. REPORT OF AN AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL MISSION TO NORTHERN IRELAND, June
13, 1978, EUR 45/01/78 [hereinafter 1978 AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT].
80. Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act of 1978, ch. 5, pt. I, § 8, 1. The
precursor to § 8, 1 can be found at § 6, i, pt. 1 of the Northern Ireland (Emergency
Provisions) Act of 1973, adopted from the Diplock Report.
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statement . . . . ,81
This exclusionary language, taken directly from the non-dero-
gable provisions of Article 3 of the European Convention, was inter-
preted in Regina v. McCormick 82 by McGonigal, L.J., to allow "a
moderate degree of physical maltreatment for the purpose of inducing
a person to make a statement . *."..83 McGonigal also stated that
only conduct which amounted to, "torture or inhuman or degrading
treatment" and was done "for the purpose of inducing a person to
make a statement" would allow a court to exclude a statement thus
made by the accused.8 4
The causation requirement85 for exclusion, imposed in Regina v.
McCormick, allowed for the admissibility of statements made after
physical or mental degradation as long as the mistreatment was not
committed "for the purpose of" inducing the statement. This allowa-
ble "degree of physical maltreatment" certainly placed in question the
voluntariness of any confession obtained through interrogation and
led to concern over the danger of false confessions.8 6 Apprehension
surrounding the validity of these confessions is amplified by the fact
that close to 90% of all convictions in the Diplock courts are based in
whole or in part on these "confessions." In only a third of these cases
was other additional evidence introduced which may or may not have
been enough, on its own, to convict.87
This concern led the Republic of Ireland to institute a suit
against the United Kingdom in the European Court of Human Rights
in 1976.88 In February of 1977, the Attorney General of the United
Kingdom, Samuel Silkin announced that his country would discon-
tinue use of its five admitted torture techniques. 89 The United King-
dom was subsequently found guilty in 1978, by the European Court at
Strasbourg, of violating Article 3 of the European Convention which
81.. Id. § 8, T 2.
82. Regina v. McCormick et. al., 1 N. Ir. 105 (1977). See also 1978 AMNESTY INTERNA-
TIONAL REPORT, supra note 79, at 62, for a critical analysis of this decision.
83. McCormick, 1 N. Ir. at 111.
84. Id.
85. See Eisenhower, supra note 73, at 29.
86. K. BOYLE, T. HADDEN & P. HILLYARD, supra note 9, at 46.
87. Id. at 44-85 (providing a thorough statistical analysis of the percentages of various
outcomes for different groups in the Diplock courts).
88. Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1978).
89. United Kingdom Renounces Northern Ireland Torture Techniques, Amnesty Interna-
tional Newsletter, Mar. 1977. The five admitted techniques are, "hooding, prolonged periods
of standing with the fingers pressed against the wall, loud electronic noise, deprivation of sleep
and a limited diet of bread and water."
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prohibits torture.90
Fortunately, Baker, in his 1984 review of the 1978 Emergency
Provisions Act, recommended that section 8 be amended, redefining
the interpretation of "torture or inhuman or degrading treatment."
Baker stated that the definition of "torture or inhuman or degrading
treatment" was "to include and always have included the use or
threat of physical violence." 1' However, a pervasive bias can still be
seen in Baker's report with such statements as, "I am convinced that
no physical violence of any degree would now be tolerated and I can-
not believe that violence could occur, unless the accused was the ag-
gressor."' 92 Questions have persisted regarding the methods used by
the British in the north of Ireland. On November 29, 1988, Britain
was once again found guilty by the European Court at Strasbourg of




Another Diplock measure reaffirmed in the 1978 Emergency
Provisions Act was the elimination of the right to trial by jury for
scheduled offenses. 94 This procedure was also upheld in Baker's 1984
review of the 1978 legislation.95 Baker's obvious bias is seen once
again in paragraph 108 of his report where he whimsically questions,
"[w]ould there be juries in any trials if Sinn Fein came to power?"
The official reasons set forth as the basis for this decision originally
were twofold. First, there was fear that the jurors would be intimi-
dated.9 6 Second, there was a fear of unwarranted acquittals of Loyal-
ists by largely Protestant juries. 9 7 The concerns of the nationalist
community with respect to this practice can be characterized as: (1)
the loss of the right to be judged by one's peers, (2) judges becoming
case-hardened to the plight of the defendant, (3) no possibility of jury
nullification or "lawlessness", and (4) no "trial within a trial" regard-
ing admissibility of confessions or if admitted, their reliability.
90. Ireland, supra note 88.
91. BAKER REPORT, supra note 61, at app. J.
92. Id. at 55.
93. L.A. Times, Nov. 30, 1988, pt. I, at 2, col. 1.
94. Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act of 1978, ch. 5, pt. I, § 7(1) provides
that, "[a] trial on indictment of a scheduled offense shall be conducted by the court without a
jury."
95. BAKER REPORT, supra note 61, 96-108.
96. K. BOYLE, T. HADDEN & P. HILLYARD, supra note 9, at 80.
97. Id.
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The right to trial by jury has a long standing tradition in English
common law, dating back to the Magna Carta in 1215 a.d.98 This
right was considered so important as to be incorporated in the Consti-
tution of the United States.99 One justification for this time consum-
ing and inefficient process is that a person has the right to be judged
by a group of his peers who reflect a cross section of the community.
Unquestionably, a valuable safeguard of liberty exists in having twelve
ordinary members of the community, rather than one professional
judge sitting alone, be convinced of the individual's guilt. Under the
Diplock system, a judge sits alone and makes all the factual, as well as
legal determinations.
Quite conceivably, judges will, with time, become hardened to
the plight of the criminal defendant. The statistical tables compiled
by the authors of Ten Years On 100 regarding the outcome of jury ver-
sus non-jury trials in the north,
provide strong support for the view that the declining acquittal
rate in Diplock trials is the result of judges becoming case-hard-
ened. This conclusion, when combined with the fact that a very
high proportion of cases in Diplock trials are wholly dependent
upon confessions obtained during interrogation, can only increase
the general concern that the risk of innocent persons being con-
victed in Diplock courts is substantially greater than in jury
trials.10'
An additional consideration justifying jury trials in all judicial
systems is the concept of jury nullification or jury "lawlessness."' ' 02
Jury nullification occurs in those cases where the defendant, though
technically guilty, is acquitted because either the law itself or the ac-
tions of the police or prosecution make a conviction inappropriate. 103
This can only happen when the collective beliefs of the community, as
exemplified by the beliefs of the members of the jury, are such that the
98. "No freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or disseized, or outlawed, or exiled, or in
any way harmed-nor will we go upon or send upon him-save by the lawful judgment of his
peers or by the law of the land." Magna Carta, 1215 a.d., at 39. See also BAKER REPORT,
supra note 61, at 104, quoting Lord Devlin who wrote, "[o]f all the institutions that have
been created by English law, there is none other that has a better claim to be called .. .the
privilege of the Common People of the United Kingdom... it is one which no other European
people enjoys."
99. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
100. K. BOYLE, T. HADDEN & P. HILLYARD, supra note 9, at 62.
101. Id.
102. W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 830 (1986).
103. K. BOYLE, T. HADDEN & P. HILLYARD, supra note 9, at 80.
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individual circumstances of the case justify a non-legal conclusion. It
is futile to believe that this will happen with any regularity, if at all,
with a case-hardened jurist sitting alone.
A final consideration is the elimination of the "trial within a
trial" concerning the admissibility of confessions.1t 4 In a normal
criminal proceeding the judge decides admissibility and the jury de-
cides guilt or innocence. Even if the judge .. I.u... 1 .. S......,
under the rules of common law, the accused could still argue its relia-
bility to the jury. However, in the Diplock courts, the person who
determines admissibility is the same person who ultimately decides
reliability and as such, guilt or innocence. It is contrary to human
nature to assume that the ultimate fact finder can ignore evidence that
he has excluded previously or to discount the reliability of a statement
he has just admitted. This takes on great significance considering the
incredibly high percentage of convictions obtained as a result of con-
fessions after interrogation.' 0 5 In many Diplock trials the only issue
in dispute is the admissibility and/or reliability of the confession. 106
3. Burden Shifting
Under the 1978 Emergency legislation, the burden of proof shifts
to the defendant to prove lack of knowledge or control for certain
possessory offenses10 7 including possession of any explosive, firearm
or petrol bomb. Section 9(1) of the 1978 Emergency Provisions Act
states that where a person is accused of a scheduled offense involving
possession and it is proven that,
at the time of the alleged offence-
(a) he and that article were both present in any premises; or
(b) the article was in premises of which he was the occupier or
which he habitually used otherwise than as a member of the public,
the court may accept the fact proved as sufficient evidence of his
possessing (and, if relevant, knowingly possessing) that article at
that time unless it is further proved that he did not at that time
know of its presence in the premises.., or, if he did know, that he
had no control over it.108
Diplock reasoned that while everyone was entitled to a presump-
104. 1978 AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT, supra note 79, at 60. (quoting CROSS, ON
EVIDENCE 64-65 (4th ed.)).
105. K. BOYLE, T. HADDEN & P. HILLYARD, supra note 9, at 44-85.
106. Id. at 58-59.
107. Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act of 1978, ch. 5, pt. I, § 9.
108. Id.
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tion of innocence under Article 6(2) of the European Convention, o9
the situation in the north of Ireland with respect to explosives and
firearms made it, "[intolerable] that the scales should be weighted so
heavily in favour of guilty men." I0 Relying on this reasoning, Baker
recommended that burden shifting remain in place. In fact, he felt its
removal would be "an affront to justice."111
What is an affront to justice is Baker's summary dismissal of any
and all valid arguments against burden shifting. Baker places great
emphasis on the case of Regina v. Whalen,1 12 where three brothers
were convicted of possession of a gun found in the dresser drawer of a
bedroom where they all slept. Since none of the three testified, none
of the three were cross-examined.' 13 Their convictions were reversed
by the appeals court because the evidence was insufficient to sustain
the conviction.14 Baker's expressed concern is that if no one is forced
to explain the presence of a gun found in an apartment or car, then no
one could be convicted of its possession. 1 5 This reasoning is absurd.
Inferences of intent can be drawn from all types of circumstantial evi-
dence discovered through further investigation and diligent police
work. The right to remain silent and the right to be free from com-
pulsory self-incrimination should not be so lightly dismissed.
Baker simultaneously denigrated the presumption of innocence,
the right to remain silent, the right to be free from compulsory self-
incrimination and the government's burden of proof when he said:
It must be borne in mind that the statutory shifting of the onus of
proof is really a procedural device for ascertaining the truth by
forcing, in some but not by any means all cases, the accused to say
on oath that he had no knowledge. He can of course be cross-
examined but he and often he alone or with the other defendants
knows what is the truth.1 16
Obviously, it is the defendant who normally knows what actually hap-
pened. However, the reasons for protecting a person's right to remain
silent are numerous and deeply rooted in the judicial systems of both
109. European Convention, supra note 6, art. 6(2) provides that, "[elveryone charged with
a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law."
110. BAKER REPORT, supra note 61, 203.
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the United Kingdom and the United States." 7 So too are the reasons
for making the government, with all its resources, bear the burden of
proof."18 These rights were developed in civilized countries for the
protection of all citizens, not just those who are ultimately convicted.
4. Arrest, Seizure, and Detention
The authority of the police or the military to arrest, detain, or
search and seize an individual in the north of Ireland is extensive. 19
Although this authority has been curtailed somewhat since Baker's
report, it is still beyond what most people would comprehend as pos-
sible in a "democratic" state. Although Baker recommended the
elimination of internment without trial, 20 he also recommended
keeping the bulk of the Diplock provisions governing arrest and de-
tention powers. His recommendations included reducing detention
time from seventy-two to forty-eight hours'21 and requiring an objec-
tive "reasonable suspicion" rather than the subjective "suspicion"
standard for arrest in sections 11, 13, and 14 of the 1978 legislation.122
However, reasonable suspicion can be based entirely on hearsay. 123
Baker also recommended retaining the power of the Secretary of
State, or "one of his junior ministers," to extend the detention period
for an additional five days.1
24
The injustice inherent in this type of power can be seen in the
figures supplied by the Royal Ulster Constabulary' 25 ("R.U.C.")
showing that 76% of those detained are released without charge. 126
The extent to which Baker went to eliminate this obvious intelligence
gathering device of the police was merely to "suggest" that the
R.U.C. be instructed to double check their reasonable suspicion re-
garding persons arrested. 12 7 When one combines the capability to de-
tain a person for up to seven days, with the lowered standards for the
117. See E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 278-86 (3d ed. 1984).
118. See W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW, at 44-56 (1972). See also In re Win-
ship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
119. See Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act of 1978, ch. 5, pt. II, §§ 11-20.
120. BAKER REPORT, supra note 61, 236.
121. Id. 279.
122. Id. 283, 346.
123. Id. 280.
124. Id. 273.
125. The Royal Ulster Constabulary (R.U.C.) is the equivalent of the civilian police force.
See K. KELLEY, supra note 9, at 104. The British Army and the local Ulster Defense Regi-
ments (U.D.R.) also have law enforcement powers in the north of Ireland.
126. BAKER REPORT, supra note 61, 276.
127. Id. 292.
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admissibility of statements by that person, it is obvious why the
Diplock courts rely so predominately on confessions.
Since the above discussed measures are purportedly temporary
responses to an emergency situation, section (3) of Article 15 of the
European Convention requires the derogating country to inform the
Secretary when these measures "have ceased to operate."'' 28  The
United Kingdom gave this notice in 1984129 under the guise that the
situation was normal. This was of course the same year that Baker
recommended retaining virtually all of the Diplock "emergency"
measures, in place since 1973.130
The government of Margaret Thatcher has maintained a hard
and fast line that the measures in place in the north of Ireland are
strictly an "internal" matter.1 3 1 Nevertheless, the United States must
concern itself with whether or not these measures are "normal," and,
if so, whether it should promote their legitimacy by extraditing to the
north of Ireland. Since the United States is being asked to extradite to
the Diplock court system, with its incredible due process deficiencies,
Margaret Thatcher must realize these courts are no longer an internal
matter.
In addition to the measures already discussed, several draconian
restrictions have been proposed recently to combat the I.R.A. The
next section of this Comment will discuss their relevancy to an Article
3(a) inquiry.
B. Proposed Measures Affecting the Diplock Courts
Recent concern over increased I.R.A. activity has led the govern-
ment of Prime Minister Thatcher to propose several harsh measures
designed to eliminate the I.R.A. Some measures are aimed at the
publicity and financing of the I.R.A. and its political wing, Sinn
Fein.132 These include limiting banking secrecy and allowing forfei-
ture of assets to make it harder for the I.R.A. to finance its activities
along with requiring an oath of non-violence for candidates in north-
128. European Convention, supra note 6, art. 15(3). See supra note 69 for text.
129. See Note, supra note 54, at 514. This Note points out the irony that Lord Baker
admitted that Sections 11, 12, 13, and 14 of the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act
of 1978, as well as Section 12 of the 1984 Prevention of Terrorism Act violated Article 5 of the
European Convention.
130. See BAKER REPORT, supra note 61.
131. Flynn, N.Y. Times, Aug. 16, 1984, A23, col. 2.
132. Sinn Fein (Gaelic for "Ourselves Alone") is the legal political wing of the Irish Re-
publican Army. The I.R.A. itself is a proscribed organization under the Northern Ireland
(Emergency Provisions) Act of 1978, ch. 5, sched. 2.
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ern elections. 133 Television and radio broadcasts of direct statements
from the I.R.A. or Sinn Fein are now prohibited.' 34 In addition, a
"shoot to kill" policy has been rumored for years. 135 Measures affect-
ing the Diplock courts include the elimination of the right to remain
silent, 36 the reintroduction of internment without trial 137 and stiffer
prison sentences. 38
Undoubtedly, the measures regarding therght .. to fetmi-ain- silent
and the reintroduction of internment without trial are the two meas-
ures with the greatest significance to a United States jurist performing
an Article 3(a) inquiry under the 1986 Supplement. The right to re-
main silent existed at common law and has become the cornerstone of
a defendant's protection from the abuses of state power. In the de-
bates over this measure, Roy Hattersley, deputy Labor party leader in
Parliament said, "[t]he right to silence is an essential element of a free
society. . . . To abolish [it] is to place a terrible risk [on defend-
ants]."' 139 Under the proposed rule, "virtually assure[d of] pas-
sage,"' 4 an inference of guilt may be drawn when a criminal
defendant refuses to rebut the charges against him.141 In addition, a
suspect would have no right to refuse to answer police questions dur-
ing interrogation; if he or she did, this refusal could also be used at
trial.
The right to remain silent, long considered absolute in the United
States,142 was considered expendable by Baker in his 1984 report
when he referred to it as "[tihe so-called right to silence, which some
witnesses still regard as a luxury that any civilized society faced with
increasing violent crime can ill afford. . .. ,,143 To extradite a person
from the United States to a system that is devoid of such fundamental
133. L.A. Times, Nov. 25, 1988, pt. I, at 13, col. 1.
134. L.A. Times, Oct. 20, 1988, pt. I, at 17, col. 5.
135. See Flynn, supra note 131. See also, Spujt, "The Official Use of Deadly Force by the
Security Forces Against Suspected Terrorists: Some Lessons From Northern Ireland", PUB. L.
38, 39 (1986); Spujt, "Deadly Force and Riot Control in Northern Ireland", PUB. L. 35, 35
(1987). For a detailed story of one man's investigative attempt to discern this policy with
respect to the deaths of six unarmed civilians in 1982, see J. STALKER, THE STALKER AFFAIR
(1988).
136. USA Today, Oct. 21, 1988, at A4, col. 3.
137. See Washington Post, Sept. 6, 1988, Al.
138. L.A. Times, Nov. 25, 1988, pt. I, at 13, col. 2.
139. USA Today, Oct. 21, 1988, at A4, col. 3.
140. Id.
141. L.A. Times, Sept. 8, 1988, pt. I, at 16, col. 1.
142. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
143. BAKER REPORT, supra note 61, 189.
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guarantees is a difficult decision at best. At worst, it is an affirmative
participation in a miscarriage of justice.
No emergency measure ever introduced in the north inspired the
overwhelming resentment and hostility that internment without trial
did. The authors of Ten Years On explained that, "[n]umerous opin-
ion surveys have established beyond a reasonable doubt that most
Catholics have a deep seated objection to detention without trial and a
corresponding commitment to the ideals of procedural and substan-
tive criminal justice."' 44 There is also a general belief that the policy
was not only ineffective but was actually detrimental to the ends
sought by its implementation. 145 The re-implementation of this policy
undoubtedly will lead to the same type of reactionary violence that
occurred in 1971. To most Americans, the concept of interning a per-
son without trial, or even formal charges, is beyond comprehension.
For a United States judge to allow extradition of an individual to this
type of system would be an abandonment of the very tenets on which
this country and our system of justice were founded.
III. SHOULD THE UNITED STATES EXTRADITE TO THE DIPLOCK
COURT SYSTEM?
Whether the United States should extradite can only be answered
after consideration of the following: what are its legal obligations to
the United Kingdom and what are its moral obligations to the person
who is being extradited?
A. What Are the United States' Legal Obligations
to the United Kingdom?
Under the current form of the treaty, the United States shall
grant extradition if (1) the United Kingdom can show probable cause
that the suspect committed one of the twenty-nine offenses listed in
the schedule annexed to the treaty or any of the crimes listed in the
Supplement to the treaty, 146 and (2) the judge is satisfied, after an
Article 3(a) inquiry, that the person will not be punished or
144. K. BOYLE, T. HADDEN & P. HILLYARD, supra note 9, at 102 (quoting from T. Had-
den and S. Wright, A Terrorist Trial in Crumlin Road, NEW SOCIETY, June 28, 1979).
145. See Twining, supra note 7, at 414-15 for a detailed criticism of the effects of intern-
ment. See also Rauch, The Compatibility Of The Detention Of Terrorists Order (Northern Ire-
land) With The European Convention For The Protection Of Human Rights, 6 N.Y.U. J. INT'L
LAW & POLITICS 1 (Spr. 1973).
146. U.S.-U.K. EXTRADITION TREATY, supra note 2, at 234, and 1986 Supplement, supra
note 28, art. 1. See supra note 48 for text.
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prejudiced at his trial due to "race, religion, nationality, or political
opinions."' 147  This is the sum of the United States' legal obligation
owed under the treaty. However, the doctrine of universal jurisdic-
tion,148 as applicable through the four international Conventions
which are specifically incorporated in the 1986 Supplement, 149 allows
the United States to assume jurisdiction under certain circumstances.
These Conventions, and the ramifications of assuming ju-isdi;Loii,
will be discussed in the next section. Specifically considered is how
they affect the United States' moral obligations to ensure fair treat-
ment to the person being extradited.
B. What Are the United States' Moral Obligations to the Person
Being Extradited?
When a person commits a criminal offense against the state and
is captured and tried in the same jurisdiction where the offense oc-
curred, that person is "subject to" the procedural and substantive due
process of the offended state. 150 However, when the accused flees the
jurisdiction of the offended state and is captured elsewhere, different
considerations come into play. Under certain circumstances, the
United States can refuse to extradite altogether, 15 1 or it can assume
jurisdiction and try the person in federal court. Hence a situation of
concurrent' 52 jurisdiction arises for certain offenses. Therefore, when
147. 1986 Supplement, supra note 28, art. 3(a). See supra note 51 for text.
148. There are five recognized bases for criminal jurisdiction. They are the principles of
Territoriality, Nationality, Protective, Passive Personality, and Universality. Universal juris-
diction allows each and every state to try defendants for particular crimes that are regarded as
criminal universally throughout the world. It is an extremely narrow jurisdictional grant. See
M. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 349-61 (2d ed. 1986).
149. 1986 Supplement, supra note 28, art. 1. See supra note 48 for text.
These four Conventions all include universal jurisdiction provisions:
(1) Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (Hague Convention), Dec.
16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, art. 7 [hereinafter Hague Convention].
(2) Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation
(Montreal Convention), Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 564, art. 7 [hereinafter Montreal
Convention].
(3) Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Pro-
tected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, U.S.T., art. 7 [hereinafter New
York Convention].
(4) International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 18, 1979, G.A. Res. 34/
146, U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at 245, art. 8 [hereinafter Hostages Convention].
150. This is the principle of objective territoriality, supra note 148.
151. 1986 Supplement, supra note 28, art. 3(a). See supra note 51 for text.
152. Bowett, Jurisdiction: Changing Patterns ofAuthority Over Activities and Resources, in
THE STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY
DOCTRINE AND THEORY 555, 565 (R. MacDonald & D. Johnston, eds. 1983). See also L.
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the United Kingdom asks the United States to exercise its sovereign
power to return for trial a person who allegedly committed an act of
"terrorism," it is in essence asking the United States to waive its juris-
diction and "participate" in the United Kingdom's criminal justice
system. 153
This participation requires that we either approve of, or turn a
blind eye to, the emergency measures existing in the north of Ireland.
Since turning a blind eye to the Diplock courts would be irresponsi-
ble, as well as violative of Article 3(a) of the 1986 Supplement, this
request from the United Kingdom should be analyzed in terms of
whether or not the United States can approve of the system in place in
the north. If it cannot approve of the Diplock courts, then the United
States should not extradite to them.
1. The Four Conventions and the Guarantee of Fair Treatment
The New York and Hostages Conventions 154 make specific refer-
ence to the guarantees of fair treatment for the alleged offender. The
New York Convention at Article 9 states that "[a]ny person regarding
whom proceedings are being carried out in connexion with any of the
crimes set forth in article 2 shall be guaranteed fair treatment at all
stages of the proceedings."' 155 The Hostages Convention goes even
further by ensuring the rights and guarantees of the law of the State
where the offender is found. Article 8(2) reads,
Any person regarding whom proceedings are being carried out in
connexion with any of the offenses set forth in article 1 shall be
guaranteed fair treatment at all stages of the proceedings, including
enjoyment of all the rights and guarantees provided by the law of
the State in the territory of which he is present. 156
BLOOMFIELD & G. FITZGERALD, CRIMES AGAINST INTERNATIONALLY PROTECTED PER-
SONS: PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT, AN ANALYSIS OF THE UN CONVENTION at 80-82
(1975).
153. When the United Kingdom asks the United States to extradite, it is asserting that:
(a) it has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the conduct allegedly performed by
the actor; (b) it is a competent forum to try the offender, and (c) when the actor is
surrendered, he or she will be properly submitted to its judicial authorities for the
exercise of their competent jurisdictional authority. . . .These representations ...
presuppose that the requesting state: 1) is competent to exercise "in personam" juris-
diction over the relator; 2) had its legislative authority to regulate the type of conduct
allegedly committed ... and deemed in violation of that state's laws is not violative of
international law, and 3) that it is the competent forum to prosecute the offender.
M. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 270 (1974).
154. New York Convention and Hostages Convention, supra note 149.
155. New York Convention, supra note 149, art. 9.
156. Hostages Convention, supra note 149, art. 8(2) (emphasis added).
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Authors Bloomfield and Fitzgerald in their analysis of the New
York Convention 157 explain "fair treatment" in the context of Article
14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations. 5 8 In addi-
tion to requiring a "fair and public hearing by a competent, independ-
ent and impartial tribunal,"'159 this International Covenant specifically
preserves the right (1) to the presumption of innocence'lb and (2) to
be free from compelled testimony or compelled confessions of guilt. 161
As noted above, any extradition for an offense covered by the Hos-
tages Convention would require "enjoyment of all the rights and
guarantees provided by the law of" the United States.
Clearly, no one could be extradited from the United States to the
Diplock courts for an offense covered by the Hostages Convention 162
because the "rights and guarantees" provided under United States law
do not exist. Nor could anyone be extradited for any of the New
York Convention offenses, 163 because the Diplock courts do not en-
sure "fair treatment" according to the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights. In the interest of consistency then, does it
make sense to allow extradition to the Diplock courts for the offenses
listed in Article 1 of the 1986 Supplement' 64 when extradition for
157. L. BLOOMFIELD & G. FITZGERALD, supra note 152, at 111.
158. International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No.16).
159. Id. art. 14(1).
160. Id. art. 14(2).
161. Id. art. 14(3)(g).
162. Hostages Convention, supra note 149, art. 1. Article I provides:
Any person who seizes or detains and threatens to kill, to injure or to continue to
detain another person (hostage) in order to compel a third party, namely, a State, an
international intergovernmental organization, a natural or juridical person.., to do
or abstain from doing any acts as an explicit or implicit condition for the release of
the hostage commits the offence of taking of hostages ("hostage taking") within the
meaning of this convention.
163. New York Convention, supra note 149, art. 2. Article 2 lists the following extradita-
ble offenses:
The intentional commission of:
(a) a murder, kidnapping or other attack upon the person or liberty of an internation-
ally protected person;
(b) a violent attack upon the official premises, the private accommodation or the
means of transport of an internationally protected person likely to endanger his per-
son or liberty;
(c) a threat to commit any such attack;
(d) an attempt to commit any such attack; and
(e) an act constituting participation as an accomplice in any such attack ....
164. 1986 Supplement, supra note 28, art. 1. See supra note 48 for text.
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those offenses listed in the New York and Hostages Conventions is
prohibited?
The Hague and Montreal Conventions use more ambiguous lan-
guage. Article 11 of the Montreal Convention states that,
"[c]ontracting States shall afford one another the greatest measure of
assistance in connection with criminal proceedings brought in respect
to the offenses. The law of the state requested shall apply in all
cases."' 165 Similarly, the Hague Convention at Article 7 states:
The Contracting State in the territory of which the alleged offender
is found shall, if it does not extradite him, be obliged, without ex-
ception whatsoever and whether or not the offense was committed
in its territory, to submit the case to its competent authorities for
the purpose of prosecution. Those authorities shall take their deci-
sion in the same manner as in the case of an ordinary offense of a
serious nature under the law of that State. 166
The Montreal Convention is similar to the Hostages Convention
by requiring that the law of the requested state should apply to all
criminal proceedings. This would certainly eliminate the possibility
of a Diplock trial for these offenses.167 Under the Hague Convention,
if the holding state refuses to extradite, then it must "submit the case
to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution."'' 68 The
history of this phrase was interpreted by Nicholas M. Poulantzas in
his analysis of the Hague Convention. 69 According to Poulantzas,
the sentence "for the purpose of prosecution" does not mean
mandatory prosecution of the offender by the said State. The au-
thorities of this State will decide on the question of the prosecution
of the offender and on other related problems-as, for example, the
discontinuance of the proceedings in exceptional circumstances-
according to the law of the State in question and taking into con-
165. Montreal Convention, supra note 149, art. 11.
166. Hague Convention, supra note 149, art. 7.
167. Montreal Convention, supra note 149, art. 1. Article 1 defines unlawful acts as,
(a) ... violence against person on board an aircraft in flight if that act is likely to
endanger the safety of that aircraft; or
(b) destroys an aircraft ...
(c) places or causes to be placed on an aircraft . . . a device or substance which is
likely to destroy that aircraft ...
(d) destroys or damages air navigation facilities ...
(e) communicates information that he knows to be false, thereby endangering the
safety of an aircraft in flight.
168. Hague Convention, supra note 149, art. 7.
169. 18 N. POULANTZAS, CONVENTION FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF UNLAWFUL SEIZURE
OF AIRCRAFT, World Peace Through Law Center (1971).
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sideration all relevant circumstances of every concrete case. 170
The four Conventions mentioned above require "fair treatment",
the "rights and guarantees" of United States law, or prosecution "in
the same manner" as United States law, respectively. These guaran-
tees apply to any person accused of taking hostages, harming diplo-
mats or hijacking airplanes. Since it is clear that our legal and moral
obligations to the person being extradited cannot be met in the
Diplock courts, the United States must refuse extradition for these
offenses. It is morally inconsistent then, to allow extradition to these
same Diplock courts for the other offenses listed in Article 1 of the
1986 Supplement, when extradition for these Convention offenses is
prohibited.
Fair treatment according to the laws of the United States should
apply to all persons the United States extradites, not just those ac-
cused of taking hostages, harming diplomats or hijacking. If the
country requesting extradition cannot afford to guarantee these fun-
damental rights, then how can the United States afford to extradite?
This question becomes even more compelling when one considers the
other international treaty obligations the United States must meet.
2. Additional Treaty Considerations
The New York Convention also includes two additional consid-
erations. First, nothing in Article 7 is construed to "impair the prin-
ciple of non refoulement."171 Thus, if the requested state feels the
offender would not be afforded a fair trial or would be subjected to
any abusive treatment, the state should refuse to extradite. 72 This is
essentially the type of inquiry that should be made under Article 3(a)
of the 1986 Supplement. 73 Secondly, the preamble to the New York
Convention specifically states:
170. Id. at 27.
171. L. BLOOMFIELD & G. FITZGERALD, supra note 152, at 96.
172. Id.
173. 1986 Supplement, supra note 28, art. 3(a). See supra note 51 for text. This inquiry is
also required under the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, Jan. 27, 1977,
E.T.S. 90, art. 8(2), providing that:
Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as imposing an obligation .. . for
mutual assistance in respect to an offence.., made for the purpose of prosecuting or
punishing a person on account of his race, religion, nationality or political opinion or
that person's position may be prejudiced for any of these reasons.
Although this Convention is applicable only to the States of the Council of Europe (which
includes the United Kingdom), it provides powerful support for the seriousness with which a
United States jurist should perform an Article 3(a) inquiry.
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[T]he provisions of the annexed Convention could not in any way
prejudice the exercise of the legitimate right to self-determination
and independence in accordance with the purposes and principles
of the Charter of the United Nations and the Declarations on Prin-
ciples of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations by peoples struggling against colonialism, alien
domination, foreign occupation, racial discrimination and
apartheid. '
74
Additionally, the United Nations Resolution on Terrorism,
[fjurther urges all States, unilaterally and in co-operation with
other States, as well as relevant United Nations organs, to contrib-
ute to the progressive elimination of the causes underlying interna-
tional terrorism and to pay special attention to all situations,
including, inter alia, colonialism, racism and situations involving
mass and flagrant violations of human rights and fundamental free-
doms and those involving alien occupation, that may give rise to
international terrorism and may endanger international peace and
security. '
75
The New York Convention preamble when combined with the United
Nations Resolution on Terrorism forcefully implies a unilateral obli-
gation, both moral and legal, on the part of the United States to "con-
tribute to the progressive elimination" of the Diplock courts. These
courts, with their emergency measures, in and of themselves, are an
underlying cause of the current "troubles" in the north of Ireland,
due to the resentment they breed.
This unilateral push should come in the form of refusing to ex-
tradite anyone under any situation unless and until the Diplock courts
are reformed to guarantee the fundamental rights of the accused.
Paragraph 9 becomes even more relevant when one considers that the
north is essentially a "colonial"' 176 situation involving "flagrant viola-
tions of human rights and fundamental freedoms."1 77  To extradite
would be to approve of, and affirmatively participate in promulgating,
174. New York Convention, supra note 149, at preamble, 4. According to Bloomfield
and Fitzgerald, this language was a compromise from the proposal of a large group of African
and Middle East delegations who wanted the preamble to state: "No provision of the present
articles shall be applicable to peoples struggling against colonialism, etc." L. BLOOMFIELD &
G. FITZGERALD, supra note 152, at 133-34.
175. United Nations Resolution on Terrorism, Dec. 9, 1985, G.A.R. 40/61, U.N. Gen.
Ass. Off. Rec. 40th Sess., Supp. No. 53 (A/40/53), at 301, 9.
176. M. MACDONALD, supra note 9, at 6-11.
177. See supra notes 88-93 and accompanying text.
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a system that is "terroristic" in and of itself. The United States has a
moral obligation not to do this.
Arguably, the United States has the highest standards of due pro-
cess afforded a criminal defendant anywhere in the world. The
United States also does not have the same type of problems that con-
front everyday life in the north of Ireland. As such, any system of
justice implemented in the north should not be expected to function
under the same type of scrutiny and controls that are in place in this
country.
However, a criminal defendant in that type of system should still
be guaranteed certain fundamental rights consistent with a civilized
state. Guarantees such as the right to remain silent without an infer-
ence of guilt, the right to be tried by a jury of your peers, the right to
force the state to bear the burden of proving its charges, and the right
not to be interned arbitrarily without charge or trial are not radical
concepts. l7 8 They areaccepted as fundamental in the international
community 79 and expected by every citizen of the United States. It is
the undeniable moral obligation of the United States, when acting in
its sovereign capacity, to ensure that anyone who is, or was, under its
control, is guaranteed these rights.
IV. IF THE UNITED STATES REFUSES TO EXTRADITE, WHAT
ARE THE OPTIONS?
The foregoing discussion leads one to the inescapeable conclu-
sion that the United States should not extradite to the north of Ire-
land under any circumstances. However, the question of what the
United States should do with the person remains open. The following
discussion details some of the options available and their possible
consequences.
A. Release
Release is obviously the most controversial option since the 1986
Supplement was aimed at eliminating this possibility. However,
under Article 3(a), extradition shall not occur if the judicial authority
178. All of these guarantees are specifically incorporated in the Constitution of the United
States. The right to remain silent is guaranteed in the 5th amendment, the right to a jury trial
is guaranteed by the 7th amendment and the presumption of innocence, the prosecutorial bur-
den, and the prohibition against arbitrary internment are guaranteed by the 14th amendment
due process clause.
179. See supra note 158.
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is convinced that the person would be punished or prejudiced on ac-
count of his "race, religion, nationality, or political opinions."1 80 Un-
fortunately, the treaty does not specify what is to happen if the
extradition is denied for one of these reasons.
Should it make a difference if the person would be "punished"
versus "prejudiced" if tried in the north of Ireland? Certainly, if ex-
tradition is refused because the individual is being punished on ac-
count of race, religion, nationality, or political opinion it would be
ludicrous to assume jurisdiction and try them here. There is simply
no argument against release of someone who proves this motivation
for prosecution. If the offender would be prejudiced in a Diplock
court hearing, then a stronger argument could be made to assume
jurisdiction and try the person in the United States court system.
This argument, discussed fully below, should be rejected. As a
compromise of competing interests, persons who prove prejudice
should be afforded an evidentiary hearing to determine if they are a
security risk to the United States. If they are not a threat to the citi-
zens of the United States, they should be allowed to stay.' 81 If, how-
ever, they are thought to pose a danger in this country, they could be
deported to an agreeable country. This procedure already exists in
the Immigration and Nationality Act, section 243(h). 8 2  Section
243(h) has its own "political exception" clause which states that the
Attorney General shall not deport if the alien's "life or freedom
would be threatened . . . on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular group, or political opinion.' 83 Although
this exception to deportation is different than the political offense ex-
ception to extradition, 84 it adds additional support for a magistrate to
consider the "political" nature of these type of crimes. This option
180. 1986 Supplement, supra note 28, art. 3(a). See supra note 51 for text.
181. Irish nationalists will rarely, if ever, pose a threat to the United States. In fact, the
original Immigration Judge in the case of Peter McMullen held that McMullen was not a
security risk to the United States. McMullen v. I.N.S., 788 F.2d 591, 593 (9th Cir. 1986).
182. Immigration and Nationality Act, section 243(h), codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h).
183. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h), (1).
184. The court in McMullen distinguished between the political offense exception under
the pre-1986 United States-United Kingdom extradition treaty, where McMullen was success-
ful, and the political exception to deportation, where McMullen was unsuccessful, 788 F.2d at
595-96. The Ninth Circuit found no res judicata effect in the magistrate's earlier determina-
tion that McMullen's offenses were "political", thus avoiding extradition, when it analyzed
whether or not he could be deported. The Ninth Circuit held that the political offense excep-
tion is tied to the language of the particular extradition treaty, while the analysis in deportation
is dependent upon the Convention and Protocols relating to the Status of Refugees, Nov. 1,
1968, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577. McMullen was deported because he was found to
19891
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
would also satisfy those who argue that the United States would be-
come a haven for "terrorists," as well as create an impetus for reform
of the Diplock courts.
B. Assume Jurisdiction
it is difficuit to imagine a scenario where someone ace-sed of a
"scheduled" offense would not be able to prove a minimum of "preju-
dice" under an Article 3(a) inquiry if tried in the Diplock courts.
However, if such a case arose, the United States should still refuse to
extradite because extraditing would be an explicit acceptance of the
entire Diplock process. We should refuse to participate in any way in
a system that so wholly lacks the fundamental guarantees of fairness.
Instead, the United States could assume jurisdiction and try the per-
son in an American court with all of the procedural safeguards guar-
anteed under the United States Constitution.
Even though this assumption of jurisdiction is specifically al-
lowed under all four of the Conventions incorporated in the 1986 Sup-
plement,18 5 it has a number of inherent problems. First, there is no
rational distinction why the offenses listed in these Conventions
should be treated any differently than the offenses listed in the 1986
Supplement. The United States has a moral obligation to ensure fair
treatment for all persons under its control, not just those accused of
taking hostages, harming diplomats or hijacking airplanes. Conse-
quently, the option of assuming jurisdiction should apply to all extra-
ditable offenses, not just offenses under the four Conventions.
However, the doctrine of universal jurisdiction is one that by its
very nature is limited in application.8 6 True universal jurisdiction
exists only when the crime itself is "regarded as offensive to the inter-
national community as a whole."' I8 7 Piracy is truly the only univer-
sally recognized crime, although arguments have been made for both
genocide and war crimes.' 88 A second premise for universal jurisdic-
tion has been advanced when a specific treaty clause grants jurisdic-
have committed a "serious non-political crime" prior to admission into the United States and
consequently was excluded from the protection of the Refugee Convention.
185. See supra note 149.
186. Murphy, Protected Persons and Diplomatic Facilities, LEGAL ASPECTS OF INTERNA-
TIONAL TERRORISM 277, 303 (1978).
187. M. SHAW, supra note 148, at 359.
188. Id. at 361. See also R. WALLACE, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A STUDENT INTRODUC-
TION 104 (1986).
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tion to try the person in the custody state.' 89 This has been termed
quasi-universal jurisdiction' 90 because it expands jurisdiction, by
agreement between the parties, beyond what is considered a true uni-
versal crime. This is what the current extradition treaty (the 1986
Supplement) calls for with respect to the four Convention offenses. A
third proposed basis for universal jurisdiction includes those crimes
"under municipal law (not international law) for which all municipal
legal systems make provision."' 9' Generally, this third basis has been
rejected 92 and should be rejected here as well.
Secondly, although the four Conventions listed in the 1986 Sup-
plement allow quasi-universal jurisdiction for the crimes of taking
hostages, harming diplomats or hijacking airplanes, the other crimes
listed in the 1986 Supplement 93 are not of the type that are recog-
nized universally. Murder is a prime example. Although all munici-
pal legal systems outlaw the act of murder, not all would consider the
killing of a soldier from an occupying country by a nationalist para-
military group to be murder. 194 Certainly, they would not be consid-
ered "protected persons" under the Geneva Convention for the Pro-
tection of War Victims.1 95 This is true regardless of whether or not
the state agrees with the politics of the para-military group.
Allowing universal jurisdiction to encompass non-universal
crimes would be a dangerous precedent. This expansion would create
an opportunity for abuse on the part of the prosecuting authorities in
any state seeking to expand its jurisdiction. The "political" atmos-
phere surrounding these trials would undoubtedly influence the ac-
tions of the custody state. 96 Therefore, it would be an invalid
extension of the doctrine of universal jurisdiction for the United
States to try a person accused of a "scheduled" offense in the courts of
the United States.
Finally, assuming jurisdiction would provide no impetus for re-
form of the Diplock courts. It would not meet the United States'
unilateral obligation to "contribute to the progressive elimination of
189. R. WALLACE, supra note 188, at 105.
190. M. SHAW, supra note 148, at 362.
191. Bowett, supra note 152, at 564.
192. Id.
193. 1986 Supplement, supra note 28, art. 3(a). See supra note 51 for text.
194. M. GREENSPAN, SOLDIER'S GUIDE TO THE LAWS OF WAR 3 (1969).
195. Geneva Convention for the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365.
196. Bowett, supra note 152, at 563.
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the causes underlying international terrorism"'' 97 because it does not
provide an incentive to the United Kingdom to reform the Diplock
courts. If the British thought that I.R.A. fugitives would spend sig-
nificant time in United States prisons, they would no doubt be satis-
fied with the status quo in the Diplock courts. Therefore, assuming
jurisdiction should be rejected.
CONCLUSION
The extent of derogation that exists in the Diplock courts in the
north of Ireland is beyond comprehension to most Americans. Any
legitimate judicial inquiry under Article 3(a) could come to no other
conclusion. Because of this, the United States should not implicitly or
explicitly approve of these courts by extraditing to them. The United
States' options are to release, deport, or assume jurisdiction and try
the case in an American court. Assuming jurisdiction is inconsistent
with the United States' other international obligations. Release is the
option more in conformity with the values of the founders of the
United States who over 200 years ago fought a war for independence
from the same country that presently runs the Diplock courts. There-
fore, unless and until the United Kingdom can afford to reform the
Diplock courts to allow the full panoply of human rights and mini-
mum guarantees of due process to everyone in the north of Ireland,




197. See United Nations Resolution on Terrorism, supra note 175.
198. On October 20, 1989, the convictions of the "Guildford Four," Gerard Conlon, Paul
Hill, Patrick Armstrong, and Carole Richardson, all imprisoned since 1974, were reversed by a
British appeals court after the attorney representing the government admitted the convictions
were based on evidence "concocted" by the police. "Although all four confessed to the bomb-
ings, they later maintained that the confessions were obtained after beatings and intense intimi-
dation at the hands of the police. There was no forensic evidence to back the prosecutor's case,
which rested entirely on the retracted confessions and statements from the police." The rever-
sal of the "Guildford Four" convictions has led to increased speculation about the innocence
of the "Birmingham Six" and Annie Maquire, a woman imprisoned due to Gerard Conlon's
retracted confession. Conlon's father, Giussepe, jailed in connection with the Annie Maquire
case, died in prison. He was pardoned posthumously. The British Home Secretary, Mr. Hurd,
has promised an "investigation". Boston Globe, Oct. 20, 1989, National/Foreign section, at 2.
280 [Vol. 12:249
